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It is commonly assumed that a polity possessing a legal and administrative system, 
representative institutions, diplomatic status and the ability to generate and allocate 
revenue, must have a citizenry. True to its anomalous character as a political entity having 
many of the attributes of a state without actually being one, the EC nonetheless did 
without citizens of its own for most of its history. Member states and their governments 
sufficed. From the 1960s onwards, however, intermittent worries that the elite driven 
process of economic integration might ultimately overreach popular support issued in 
proposals for some form of citizen involvement in Europe. The decision to establish a 
`citizenship of the Union' at Maastricht aroused great expectations, therefore.  A 
potentially momentous step of great symbolic importance, it promised much needed 
popular legitimation for the increasingly extensive political and social measures required 
to implement and stabilise the common market. In the event, the actual citizenship 
provisions generated a more muted response.  Malcolm Anderson and his co-authors 
summed up the prevailing mood in an early assessment of the measure. They observed 
how  `[i]n accepting this reform, the member states followed a Community tradition of 
attaching grand concepts like `union' to the integration process, which has often tended to 
raise both fears and hopes that turn out to be unfounded once the substance behind the 
rhetoric is revealed. The same will probably be true of the new citizenship: ... in fact [it 
has] changed very little.'
2  
  The dominance of rhetoric over reality continued at Amsterdam. It was supposed 
to place `citizen rights at the heart of the Union'. However, the new Treaty poses more 
questions than it solves, even if the specific complaint of Anderson et. al. was partly 
addressed. They had argued that `the most telling feature' of the original reform was not Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1530446
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the citizenship entitlements themselves but the fact that the related issues of common 
visa, immigration and asylum policy were to be handled in a completely different manner 
under the new pillar structure of the Union.
3 This novel architectural arrangement  
distinguishes those matters that form part of the Community proper (the first pillar), 
which are decided by the established institutional mechanisms and come under the 
jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice, from Common Security and Foreign Policy 
(second pillar) and Cooperation in Justice and Home Affairs (third pillar) where 
intergovernmentalism prevails. Whereas Article 8 creating the new status belonged to the 
amended EEC Treaty and the so-called Community pillar, issues relating to border 
controls came under the third pillar. As a result, `the key condition for the exercise of 
[European] citizenship rights', namely `the ability to cross borders between member states 
unhindered' could not be enforced through the courts. `This', they concluded, `seems to 
make a mockery of the freedom of movement that is supposed to be at the core of EC 
citizenship.'
4 Amsterdam rectified this situation by bringing these measures into the first 
pillar, although Britain, Ireland and Denmark have a derogation, with the third pillar now 
restricted to the cumbersomely designated Police and Judicial Cooperation in Criminal 
Matters.  Yet the status of European citizenship remains profoundly ambiguous. For the 
EU's hybrid nature as both a supranational polity and an intergovernmental organisation 
has become ever more pronounced. Indeed, this ambiguity is written into the very nature 
of European Citizenship since access to it rests firmly via the variously defined 
nationality requirements of the member states. 
  Amsterdam confirmed the trend whereby the Union's structure has become ever 
more complex as its competences  have grown. The pillars continue in place, reinforcing 
the ever greater flexibility in the speeds and degree to which core policies are adopted by 
member states, and the variety of actors - from NGOs and regions to governments and 
different tiers of bureaucrats -  involved in the decision making process. The one 
significant change to the citizenship provisions themselves, a supposed clarification to  3 
Article 8 (1) TEU adding the rider that `Citizenship of the Union shall complement and 
not replace national citizenship', neatly captures this increasingly differentiated and 
flexible character of the Union, and the complex ways it tries to combine different levels 
of sub national, national and transnational governance. Many commentators believe such 
a multi-track Europe to be incoherent and see the development of a common citizenship 
as a way forward to a fully-fledged federal European political system. By contrast, I wish 
to take up the challenge and ask how such a messy polity might work, and in particular 
whether citizenship can be correspondingly multiple and multi-layered. Malcolm once 
archly remarked that political theorists do not do research in the `real' sense - they just sit 
in their studies and make it all up. May be. But if so, that quality is an advantage when 
explaining an unprecedented event - or so at least I hope to show. 
  To see how such a multiple citizenship might be conceived I shall identify two 
ideal types of citizenship - the cosmopolitan and the communitarian, that correspond to 
the transnational and sub/national levels of the European Union respectively, and 
examine different ways in which they might be combined.
5 Cosmopolitan citizenship is 
rights-based. The justification, scope and application of these rights are universal and 
uniform, their subjects individuals. The implications of respecting human rights may be 
cashed out in either interactional or institutional terms, as pertaining to either the actions 
of individual persons and agencies, or the rules and procedures of any schemes that might 
link them.
6  Whereas the first may make it hard to assign a global responsibility for very 
much, and hence is favoured by libertarians, the second focuses on the justice of the  
practices and arrangements  within which people are involved and jointly and severally 
responsible, and hence makes a welfarist perspective more plausible. Proponents of the 
institutionalist thesis argue world markets involving the globalisation of distribution, 
production and exchange, and the emerging system of international law, diplomacy and 
security, mean we all participate to some extent in such an institutional scheme, and 
hence have a responsibility for rights violations across the globe.
7  There are few if any 4 
self-contained communities, and even local rights infractions may have global macro 
explanations of their incidence.  
  Moral cosmopolitanism need not imply world government.
8 The value of any set 
of political institutions depends entirely on how far it furthers human rights and welfare.  
Democratic participation and popular sovereignty play a purely contingent role in this 
argument. Even if democracy partly embodies the notion of equal rights, it cannot be 
counted on to uphold them. At best, it operates as a mechanism of imperfect procedural 
justice.  It serves as an instrumental mechanism for individuals to voice and protect their 
interests by influencing and controlling the decisions affecting their lives, albeit indirectly 
through the election of the decision-makers.   Should democracy fail to offer the best 
protection for rights, or even endangers them as a result of myopic or tyrannous 
majorities, then non-democratic mechanisms, such as judicial review by human rights 
courts or regulation by expert agencies, are to be preferred.
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  By contrast, communitarians believe that universal human rights  exert only a 
limited  claim on our attention. We can invoke such notions in extreme situations, such as 
famine or genocide, when our very humanity is at stake. But the rights of human beings 
per se  will always be `basic'.
10 Their fuller, everyday meanings derive from their location 
within a specific local culture. Since principles of rights and justice get reiterated in a 
variety of ways within different communities, there can be no appeal to a universal core 
shared across all societies. Beyond the establishment of a low base line, the `thin' minimal 
humanitarian morality of exceptional circumstances has little bearing on the `thick' 
maximal morality we possess as members of a given society.
11 
  Community is defined in terms of  a nation state or, in the case of national 
minorities, a self-contained region. Nationality provides citizens with `a common world 
of meanings' that are explicitly linked to a political unit capable of acting on them. When 
linked to a state, this common culture helps citizens identify with each other and commits 5 
them `to dividing, exchanging and sharing social goods' amongst themselves according to 
agreed principles.
12 
  Communitarians believe their account fills a motivational and justificatory lacuna 
within the cosmopolitan theory. In practice most rights and duties have to be spelt out in 
detail, so we know who owes what to whom, when, where and why. They contend the 
answers to these questions can all be traced back to community. Rights cannot be 
separated from and frame the pursuit of various goods, as cosmopolitans maintain. Rights 
to property or to free speech, for example, belong to particular forms of life, the market 
and democracy respectively, that embody some good, such as prosperity and truth, that 
provides their justification, and hence limits their application. Likewise, conflicts of 
rights can only be adjudicated within the context of the goods and practices of the society 
concerned. For rights defend the interests not of this or that isolated individual, but of the 
quality of human flourishing and interaction available to all individuals living within a 
given community.  
  Community also provides the moral cement needed to facilitate human 
interaction. Most social, economic and political practices operate on the basis of 
reciprocity and trust between virtual strangers. Markets rely on fair dealing and promise 
keeping between traders, public goods provision assumes that beneficiaries will not free 
ride, welfare that I have duties to others, and so on. Respect for rights alone does not 
account for such moral bonds. For they entail acts of supererogation, virtue and the 
disinterested pursuit of excellence that go beyond those duties that are merely correlative 
to another's rights.  
  Democracy, in the guise of national self-determination, plays a pivotal role in this 
argument. On the one hand, a national community makes democracy possible. It defines a 
demos who feel bound together by a sense of a shared fate and mutual responsibility. 
Such sentiments lead minorities to accept majority decisions and, more importantly, 
motivate majorities to take into account the opinions and concerns of minorities rather 6 
than tyrannising over them. For compromise and the avoidance of a purely self-regarding 
stance are far more likely amongst a people who identify reasonably strongly with each 
other. On the other hand, democracy enables the communal good to be debated, defined 
and defended. If a naturalistic ethnic nationalism is to be avoided, nationality must be 
seen as a political construct which allows different claims and values to be 
accommodated. For this reason, communitarians standardly adopt a deliberative as 
opposed to a purely aggregative model of democracy. Whereas the cosmopolitan citizen 
is  a bearer of private rights and sees politics as means to defend them and pursue 
personal preferences, the communitarian citizen is an active participant within a 
collective enterprise.
13 
  Aspects of the EU can be interpreted according to either model.  Cosmopolitans of 
a libertarian hue see the four freedoms of labour, capital, goods and services as the 
Union's main rationale.
14 Integration has a primarily negative purpose - the removal of all 
barriers to trade, although some positive regulation is required to ensure this occurs. 
Consumption, production and exchange within the market are the prime attributes of 
citizenship. Libertarians are distinctly luke warm about political integration. Useful to 
remove  troublesome rulers, when uncontrolled democracy allows organised interests to 
inflate state expenditure for their own benefit. A European political system must 
incorporate mechanisms such as judicial review to keep politics in its place and protect 
property rights, therefore. Welfare liberals have a more positive view of rights and a 
correspondingly fuller picture of the EU.
15 They welcome its evolving social dimension 
and would like much more trans-European redistribution. However, they too are cautious 
about the democratic aspect, and favour a monitoring role for the European Court of 
Justice and strengthening the position of the European Court of Human Rights. Both 
shades of cosmopolitanism see the EU as part of an evolving global system. Libertarians, 
for example, have been enthusiasts for enlargement to the East, whilst welfare liberals 
generally condemn the increasingly exclusionary immigration policy adopted by the 7 
member states. Both oppose state sovereignty,
16 and see policy making at the EU level as 
a matter of pure convenience. 
  Communitarians also come in different varieties. Ethnic nationalists see the EU as 
a geographical expression cemented by common racial and historical links. This view of 
Europe as a Union of Peoples has clear racist implications for the numerous non-
European immigrant communities, and is largely restricted to politicians of the extreme 
right. Civic nationalists see Europe in more confederal terms. Co-operation at a European 
level may be necessary to preserve national economic interests in a globalising world 
economy, or for mutual defence and security. However, civic nationalists insist that any 
transfer of powers must be regarded as provisional, with nations retaining a residual claim 
to reappropriate them whenever vital national concerns are at stake.
17 Notoriously, this 
was De Gaulle's position and lies behind the Luxembourg Accords. Although the greater 
use of majority voting within the Council of Ministers has undercut this agreement to a 
large extent, the ability of Member States to derogate from common provisions on these 
grounds has also increased. 
  If the EU displays both cosmopolitan and communitarian features, are they 
compatible? The present assumption appears to be that they are because the cosmopolitan 
principles of `liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms and 
the rule of law' are `principles which are common to the member states' (Treaty of 
Amsterdam (TA)  F1).  The Union's respect for both `fundamental rights' (TA F2) and 
`for the national identities of its member states' (TA F3) should not create tensions, 
therefore. This position may best be described as communitarian cosmopolitan, whereby 
different communities are assumed to share core cosmopolitan ideas with the EU itself 
operating as an all-encompassing community of communities. It fits with the principal 
interpretation of a federal  Europe, for example, in which national political identities and 
institutions would feed into a European system with its own symbols of flag, passport, 
anthem.
18  8 
  However, there are numerous difficulties with this position. Acceptance of liberal 
principles is compatible with a group's desire to be self-determining and distinct. Rights 
need interpretation when applied to concrete circumstances, and can give rise to 
incompatible and incommensurable views. For example, opinions can reasonably differ 
as to whether minority language rights promote or hinder free speech, and can conflict 
with the four freedoms. The European Convention accepts, for example, that many rights 
are conditional and subject to such limitations `as are prescribed by law and are necessary 
in a democratic society in the interests of public safety, for the protection of public order, 
health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others' (e.g. Articles 
8-11). As the German Federal Constitutional Court acknowledged in its verdict on the 
Brunner challenge to the Maastricht Treaty, these sorts of dilemmas cannot necessarily be 
resolved a priori.
19 There may be numerous reasonable solutions on offer.
20   What 
counts is that the deciding body is recognised as a legitimate authority by the people 
affected. The Court's view that only German institutions have the requisite status for the 
German people has been taken by some commentators as an implicit attack on the 
integrity of the EU.
21 Opinion polls indicate, however, that a similar perception with 
regard to their own political and legal institutions is widely shared by the populations of 
most member states, and arguably by their respective judicial systems as well.
22 Certainly, 
there is little evidence of the EU having created a European demos or shared political 
culture.  There are no European political parties, for example, and the Euro has had to 
rely on a purely abstract symbolism of imaginary bridges since real European bridges and 
personalities have a primarily national significance. 
  Is the EU  a mere confederation of nations, therefore? Whilst it certainly has many 
features consistent with this model, we have seen that integration is evolving beyond the 
confederal stage and becoming far more complex. For the very forces driving states 
towards greater international co-operation have also encouraged sub and trans national 
groups to emerge. Political community may not be established at the EU level, but it no 9 
longer so clearly resides at the national level either. Instead we have a proliferation of 
different communities depending on the policy or issue involved. In some areas national 
interests and ideals prevail, in others regional, functional, ideological or other affiliations 
are in play.  
  This emerging multilevel and multitrack polity, involving a plurality of different 
kinds of concern and values,  requires a different approach - one I shall dub cosmopolitan 
communitarianism.  By contrast to communitarianism sans phrase, this conception 
assumes membership of a variety of different, interacting and occasionally conflicting 
communities.  And in contradistinction to communitarian cosmopolitanism its aim is not 
simply to put flesh on an assumed consensus on universal principles. Unlike 
cosmopolitanism, agreement on and interpretations of rights have to be constructed 
through the political process with such notions thickening in a variety of ways between 
groups and policies. The trick is to devise a political system capable of ensuring such 
negotiations occur in a manner that ensures equal concern and respect of those concerned. 
As I have argued elsewhere,
23 the answer lies in a return to the neo-roman republican 
tradition within which liberty was seen as a civic achievement resulting from the 
prevention of arbitrary domination.
24  This involves a different conception of 
constitutionalism to the liberal cosmopolitan's - one based on the form of government 
rather than a legal framework, that employs rather than constrains politics.
25 The key is to 
so disperse power that political decisions can be contested so as to ensure they track the 
interests and ideals of those affected. From this perspective, the messiness of the EU's 
decision making process, far from being a liability, becomes a positive advantage. 
European citizenship sits alongside our other political identities, becoming more or less 
important according to the issue under consideration, without any need to claim a 
superior status. To those who doubt the workability of this idea, I point to the facility with 
which Malcolm shifts from British to French citizenship on crossing the channel. This 10 
ability makes him the very model of a European citizen, so conceived - a fact that surely 
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